Does Foreign Ownership Increase Financial

Reporting Quality? by Yohan An, Yohan An
Asian Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2, 81–101, 2015 
 
© Asian Academy of Management and Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 2015 
DOES FOREIGN OWNERSHIP INCREASE FINANCIAL 
REPORTING QUALITY? 
 
Yohan An  
 
Department of Finance & Accounting, College of Business Administration 
Tongmyoung University, 428, Sinseon-ro, Nam-gu, Busan 
Republic of Korea, 608-711 
 
E-mail: accahn@tu.ac.kr 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using panel data, this paper investigates how foreign ownership affects the financial 
reporting quality of firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE), one of the highest 
foreign-investor capital markets in the world during the period from 2000 to 2005. 
Existing studies suggest that foreign ownership may either increase or decrease the 
quality of financial reporting, suggesting that foreign ownership is explained using two 
conflicting hypotheses: The active-monitoring hypothesis and the transient hypothesis. In 
emerging markets, where family ownership is predominant, conservatism is an important 
measure of financial reporting quality because conservatism decreases opportunistic 
management behaviours and mitigates information asymmetries. This paper tests 
conservatism as a proxy for financial reporting quality using three piecewise accrual 
models, proposed by Ball and Shivakumar (Journal of Accounting Research, 44, 207–256 
(2006)); the cash flow model, the Dechow and Dichev model, and the Jones model. This 
research finds that foreign ownership is positively associated with conservatism in all 
three models. This result supports the active-monitoring hypothesis of foreign ownership, 
indicating that foreign ownership mitigates managerial opportunism, thereby increasing 
the quality of financial reporting. 
 
Keywords: foreign ownership, quality of financial reporting, conservatism, Korea, panel 
data 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Due to sustained globalisation, foreign owners are now major institutional 
shareholders around the world. According to investigations by the Korean Stock 
Exchange (KSE), foreign ownership in Korean listed firms accounted for 13.5%1 
of US firms' total equity, 35.7% of that of UK firms, 40.1% of that of French 
firms, 20.1% of that of German firms, and 26.7% of that of Japanese firms as of 
2006. Specifically, in emerging countries, financial globalisation and 
liberalisation allow foreign ownership to play a key corporate governance role. 
Most previous literature on the role of foreign ownership in corporate governance 
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in emerging countries focuses on the significant benefits from foreign 
participation due to effective monitoring of the controlling shareholders or family 
ownership (Kho, Stulz, & Warnock, 2009; Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, & Matos, 
2011). Motivated by rapid inflows of foreign investors into the Korean capital 
market, this study examines the association between foreign ownership and the 
degree of financial reporting quality of Korean firms listed on the KSE during the 
sample period from 2000 to 2005.  
 
The Korean data provide several unique features that are well suited to test the 
effects of foreign ownership on conservatism as a proxy of financial reporting 
quality. First, Korean laws strictly prohibited both hostile and foreign mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As) before the Asian financial crisis of 1997. In addition, 
foreign ownership was restricted until the end of 1997; foreign individual 
investors were forbidden to hold more than 7% of shares, and foreign ownership 
as a group could not exceed 26% of total shares. These laws protected the 
incumbent controlling shareholders from outside investors. In December 1997, 
the ceiling on foreign equity ownership was raised from 26% to 55% of total 
shares outstanding. This ceiling was completely eliminated in May 1998. As a 
result, in 2004, foreign investors accounted for 43.6% of the total market value of 
the KSE. This figure was the fourth highest in the world, following Hungary 
(72.6%), Finland (55.7%), and Mexico (46.4%)2. After the global financial crisis 
of 2008, foreign ownership in the KSE fell by 25.6%, but Korea still ranked as 
one of the highest foreign-investor countries in the world3. With increased equity 
participation of foreign shareholders, foreign shareholders demand improvement 
in the financial reporting quality of Korean firms. Thus, the Korean sample 
provides a good environment for testing the effects of foreign ownership on 
financial reporting quality resulting from foreign investment liberalisation and a 
rapid increase in foreign ownership. Second, not much attention has been given 
to the impact of foreign ownership on financial reporting quality. Most prior 
studies on foreign ownership have focused on the cost of capital (Henry, 2000), 
economic growth (Bekaert, Harvey, & Lundblad, 2011), and stock price (Bae, 
Ozoguz, Tan & Wirjanto, 2012). Conservatism is an important measure of 
financial reporting quality in emerging countries with opaque disclosure systems 
and weak corporate governance practices, because conservatism reduces the 
manager's incentives and ability to manipulate accounting numbers and thus 
reduces information asymmetry and the deadweight losses that information 
asymmetries generate, thereby increasing firm and equity values (LaFond & 
Watts, 2008; Balakrishnan, Watts, & Zuo, 2015). The main purpose of removal of 
the foreign ownership limitation in Korea was increasing financial reporting 
quality with the professional knowledge and adept skills in corporate governance 
afforded by foreign firms. Because most firms in Korea are family firms, 
corporate governance mechanisms have not effectively operated due to 
controlling family ownerships. Firms with large foreign ownership expect to 
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disclose their earnings conservatively because of sophisticated foreign investors, 
generally from countries with well-developed corporate governance practices.  
 
This study expects to contribute the literature on foreign shareholders as 
participants in the corporate governance mechanisms of a country, with their 
necessary incentives and their expertise in monitoring (Sachs & Warner, 1995; 
Kang & Stulz, 1997; Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2000), by analysing what impacts 
they exert upon a firm's financial reporting quality when such investors become 
part of the corporate governance structure. As a large institutional shareholder, 
there are two conflicting views on foreign shareholders: active monitoring and 
the transient hypothesis. According to the active-monitoring hypothesis, foreign 
shareholders play an important role in monitoring management to protect their 
interests (Sachs & Warner, 1995) and to resolve their own information 
asymmetries (Kang & Stulz, 1997). However, in the view of the transient 
hypothesis, foreign shareholders are just short-term investors and thus do not 
have significant incentives to monitor firms' management (Graves, 1988; Kim, 
Krinsky & Lee, 1997). While local capital market participants in emerging 
countries fail to efficiently check and control firm activities, it has been widely 
acknowledged that foreign shareholders assume important roles in monitoring 
management as institutional shareholders or as outside directors (Sachs & 
Warner, 1995). The role of foreign investors as outside monitors of corporate 
governance activities, as expected, would be even bigger in Korea because of 
higher foreign-investor holdings, compared with other countries. Despite the 
importance of foreign ownership and financial reporting quality in emerging 
countries in recent years, empirical studies of the relationships between foreign 
ownership and financial reporting quality are very limited. This study is able to 
fill the gap. Accordingly, this study provides important evidence that foreign 
shareholders as an outside monitor in emerging markets affect financial reporting 
quality by focusing on the impact on foreign ownership exerted by the foreign 
shareholders. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Definition of Conservatism 
 
According to the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 2 of 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), conservatism is defined as "a 
prudent reaction to uncertainty and an attempt to ensure that uncertainty and 
risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered." Under 
conservative accounting, expenses or losses are immediately recognised, whereas 
revenues or gains are not realised until uncertainties surrounding economic 
events are resolved. For example, conservatism is the use of the lower of cost or 
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market value in valuing inventories. In addition, conservatism uses the rule that 
accrued net losses should be recognised on firm purchase commitments for goods 
in inventory. Similar to SFAC No. 2, the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) use prudence as the same concept as conservatism (Grambovas, 
Giner & Christodoulou, 2006). The International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) Framework paragraph 37 states that "prudence is the inclusion of a 
degree of caution in the exercise of the judgments needed in making the estimates 
required under conditions of uncertainty, such that assets or income are not 
overstated and liabilities or expenses are not understated." In the concept of 
transparency, the quality of financial reporting can be measured by conservatism. 
The SEC Recommendation No. 8 defines criteria for determining financial 
reporting quality as the degree of aggressiveness or conservatism of accounting 
principles and underlying estimates. Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) and Ball, 
Robin and Wu (2003) assert that conservatism captures financial statement 
transparency.  
 
Why Conservatism is Important in Emerging Countries? 
 
Specifically, conservatism is important to East-Asian emerging countries as a 
measure of the quality of financial reporting. In East Asian emerging-market 
countries, a substantial number of firms are owned and managed by controlling 
families (Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000), and controlling family shareholders 
in East Asian countries tend to take advantage of flexibility and discretion over 
accounting choice and auditor selection to distort the firm's true earnings 
performance (Fan & Wong, 2002). Ball et al. (2003) find that earnings quality 
(transparency) of four East Asian countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Thailand) is low, despite having high-quality accounting standards (e.g., 
IFRS and U S Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, GAAP), because 
controlling family ownership overrides incentives to report higher-quality 
earnings. During the Asian financial crisis, many firms in East-Asian countries 
became bankrupt. These bankruptcies were linked to accounting frauds such as 
overstating profits and diminishing liabilities. For example, the Daewoo group, 
the second largest business group in Korea, was alleged to have organised Asia's 
biggest single accounting fraud—false accounting during the Asian financial 
crisis that inflated the value of Daewoo's equity by USD$32 billion. Rezaee 
(2002) argues that most accounting frauds result from overstatement of earnings. 
The majority of accounting frauds involve aggressively applied GAAP (Lobo & 
Zhou, 2006).  
 
Imhoff and Thomas (1989) suggest that higher quality of earnings is most closely 
associated with conservative accounting methods and full financial disclosure. 
Penman and Zhang (2002) suggest that conservative accounting practice affects 
both earnings quality on income statements and the financial items quality on 
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balanced sheets. Ball et al. (2000) argue that conservatism is a property of 
accounting income and captures financial statement transparency, because the 
timely recognition of economic loss in accounting income attempts to force 
managers to stem their losses more quickly and attempts to reduce investment 
risk for investors. Accordingly, conservatism plays a corporate governance role 
by monitoring management, debt, and other contracts. Conservative accounting 
income imposes higher verifiability duty of economic income recognition than 
that of economic losses (Watts, 2003a). Watts (2003a) argues that conservatism 
constrains managerial opportunistic behaviours and offsets managerial biases 
with its asymmetrical verifiability requirement. A higher level of conservatism in 
the calculation of earnings requires greater verifiability of revenues relative to 
expenses, and this serves to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of managers to 
report higher earnings for their own self-interest. In addition, higher conservatism 
in the calculation of earnings decreases the likelihood that earnings will omit 
concurrent economic losses, thereby reducing investors' potential losses due to 
flawed earnings information. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that the demands 
for higher quality of financial statements are reflected in the greater legal 
obligations of issuers, managers, and auditors to recognise economic losses in a 
more timely fashion. Lara, Osma and Penalva (2009) find strong governance 
firms show significantly higher levels of accounting conservatism, because 
strong-governance firms tend to use discretionary accruals to provide information 
to users about bad news in a timelier manner. Thus, conservatism reduces 
management's opportunistic behaviours to increase (decrease) income (losses), 
thus increasing the quality of financial reporting and transparency.  
 
Two Conflicting Views of Foreign Ownership 
 
The role of foreign shareholders as institutional shareholders is controversial and 
is explained using two conflicting hypotheses: active monitoring and transient 
hypotheses. According to the active-monitoring hypothesis, institutional investors 
are long-term investors with significant incentives to actively oversee managers. 
The monitoring of managers has the characteristics of a public good, and as a 
result, outside block shareholders would be able to monitor the managers for the 
purpose of increasing firm value and quality of financial reporting. 
 
Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that foreign investors assume important roles in 
monitoring management similar to the roles played by large outside shareholders 
in emerging countries because foreign investors have positive incentives to 
protect their wealth. Using Indian data, Khanna and Palepu (2000) find that 
shareholding by foreign investors is positively correlated with firm value, which 
implies that the foreign institutional investors are equipped with the incentive to 
monitor firms' activities and have the advanced firms' monitoring systems. More 
recently, He and Shen (2014) investigated the impact of foreign investors on the 
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informational efficiency of share price in Japanese firms, and they found 
increased foreign ownership improved share price efficiency. In emerging 
markets, foreign institutional investors in China significantly reduced 
expropriation by controlling shareholders because foreign investors were less 
related to political pressures and positively monitored invested firms (Huang & 
Zhu, 2015). After the removal of foreign ownership limitation in Taiwan, foreign 
investors contributed significant growth to the Taiwanese capital market and 
increased the voluntary disclosure of Taiwan firms (Lien, Tseng & Wu, 2013). 
Thus, foreign shareholders seem to play a valuable monitoring role as a large 
institutional investor. External monitoring by foreign investors as large 
institutional investors can constrain the opportunities for discretionary choices of 
management in providing financial accounting information, thereby increasing 
financial reporting quality.  
 
On the other hand, the transient investor hypothesis suggests that institutions are 
transient investors without significant incentives to monitor firm management. 
Institutions are likely to sell the firm stock in the absence of current profits 
instead of trying to monitor management to adopt value-increasing policies. 
Based on the transient investor hypothesis, foreign investors are momentum 
traders and prefer to invest in specific firms, such as large firms paying high 
dividends. Kang and Stulz (1997) find that foreign investors in Japanese firms 
hold shares in large manufacturing firms with good accounting performance, 
lower unsystematic risk, and lower leverage, which implies that foreign investors 
are more knowledgeable and informed of firms than domestic investors. Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2000) report that domestic investors are less sophisticated and 
take the opposite position to that of more sophisticated foreign investors in the 
Finnish market. They interpret that foreign investors tend to pursue momentum 
strategies, but domestic investors seem to be contrarian. Dahlquist and 
Robertsson (2001) argue that the extent of the deviation for foreign investors 
from holding the market portfolio is mostly similar to institutional investors. 
They find that foreign portfolio investors underinvest in firms with a dominant 
owner and invest more in large firms, firms paying low dividends, and firms with 
large cash positions on their balance sheets in the Swedish market. Choe, Kho 
and Stulz (2005) find that foreign investors in Korea are more likely to be 
momentum investors than domestic investors. This result implies that foreign 
investors are sophisticated investors but transient institutional investors. 
 
Foreign Ownership in Korea and Conservatism 
 
Large outside blockholders can effectively monitor management using enough 
voting control and thereby reduce agency problems (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
Specifically, in emerging markets, large outside ownership is positively 
associated with firm performance (Sachs & Warner, 1995; Mitton, 2002; 
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Lemmon & Lins, 2003). Foreign ownership of Korean firms was very small and 
was not likely to affect firms' decisions until the Korean government opened the 
capital markets to foreign investors in 1992. Since then, foreign ownership has 
gradually increased, and foreign institutional investors have become more major 
institutional investors after the foreign investors' ownership limitation was lifted 
in 1998. For instance, market capitalisation owned by foreign investors was 
37.3% of the total market value of the Korean Stock Exchange as of 2006. This 
figure is the third highest in the emerging market space, following Hungary 
(77.7%) and Mexico (45.1%). Thus, in Korea, the potentially positive impact of 
foreign shareholders can be understood as the special application of the more 
general proposition that large outside blockholders can mitigate family 
managerial opportunism. Thus, it is expected that the role of foreign investors as 
outside monitors of corporate activities would be even bigger in Korea, because 
foreign investors in Korean firms are less likely to be related to controlling 
shareholders. In addition, foreign investors have a higher burden of monitoring 
costs, due to greater information asymmetries (Kang & Stulz, 1997; Choe et al., 
2005). Foreign investors will therefore positively strengthen their monitoring 
functions to resolve information asymmetries.  
 
As to the Korean context, Cheon (2003) finds a significant positive association 
between foreign ownership and the earnings response coefficient, because foreign 
shareholders consider earnings quality (measured as discretionary accruals) in 
their investment decisions. By examining the relationships between information 
asymmetries and foreign ownership, Ahn, Shin and Chang (2005) find that 
foreign ownership prefers firms with lower discretionary accruals and forecast 
errors and larger analyst coverage (number of analysts). Accordingly, in Korea, 
the active-monitoring hypothesis may more fit foreign ownership consisting of 
large institutional shareholders than the transient hypothesis. Choi, Sul and Cho 
(2011) document that foreign block investors have a preference for firms with 
enhanced management accountability, and they take into account in selecting 
shares for their block investment whether a firm has strong corporate governance 
practices. 
 
To the extent that external monitoring by foreign investors is intense and 
effective, the opportunities for discretionary choices in providing accounting 
information become more constrained. To protect their wealth and to reduce 
monitoring costs, foreign shareholders have stronger incentives and expertise to 
independently monitor firms. Thus, higher proportions of foreign ownership 
induce firms to improve transparency and to decrease opportunistic managerial 
accounting choices and decisions. Based on these arguments, the following 
hypothesis for the association between foreign ownership and conservatism is 
tested: 
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 Hypothesis: Foreign ownership is positively associated with accounting 
      conservatism in Korean firms. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
 
This study uses Korean firms listed on the KSE for six years (2000–2005). 
However, Korean firms' data are for the fiscal years 1999 to 2006 because the 
measurement of accrual quality using Dechow and Dichev's (2002) model 
requires previous and future cash flows from operation (CFO) data. All financial 
institutions with two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) Codes4 of 65, 
66, and 67 (e.g., commercial banks, insurance firms, security brokerage firms) 
are excluded because accounting methods and the format of financial statements 
differ from those of other industries and are subject to different regulatory 
requirements.  
 
The data in this study are obtained from three sources: The KSE, firms' business 
reports (equivalent to the US 10-K) and audit reports, which are available for 
Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System5 (DART; http://dart.fss.or.kr), 
developed by the Korean Financial Supervisory Commission, OSIRIS6; publicly 
listed companies worldwide provided by the Bureau van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing (BvDEP), and the Korean Information Service (KIS) database7. 
 
The sample firms in this study were consecutively listed on the KSE from 1999 
to 2006. At the first data collection stage, consecutive list status of the sample 
firms was confirmed from the KSE web (http://kind.krx.co.kr) using the KSE 
stock index code. At the second stage, ownership data were all manually 
collected from the business reports of each firm on the DART system 
(http://dart.fss.or.kr), provided by the Korean Financial Supervisory Commission. 
Financial statements data and stock data were obtained from the OSIRIS and KIS 
databases, respectively. Finally, firms' names on the KSE were used to match 
information among DART filings, OSIRIS, and KIS. Then, all extracted data 
were classified into SIC codes. The final sample consisted of panel data from 509 
non-financial Korean firms and a total of 3,054 firm-year observations over a six-
year period. The sample firms belong to 10 industry groups based on the Korean 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC). 
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Table 1 
Sample selection procedure and final sample size 
 
This table presents the sample selection criteria, total number of sample firms and total 
firm-year observation. The data are obtained from three sources: OSIRIS, KIS-VALUE, 
and DART system. The final sample consists of 509 firm-year observations. 
 
Panel A: Summary of sample selection criteria 
Criteria: Descriptions Number of firm-year 
Firm listed on the KSE 644 
Less: Financial institution (e.g. SIC 65, 66 and 67) (52) 
Less: Delisted firms (54) 
Less: Firms with missing Data (29) 
Total sample firms 509 
 
Panel B: Number of sample firms, classified into SIC code and industry 
No. Industry group 
Number of firms 
(n = 509) 
Ratio (%) 
1 Fishing & food 41 8.06  
2 Textile & footwear 36 7.07  
3 Wood product & other machinery 53 10.41 
4 Chemical & rubber-plastic 104 20.43 
5 Non-metallic products 68 13.36  
6 Electronic & electric manufacture 63 12.38  
7 Motor 36 7.07 
8 General construction 34 6.68 
9 Wholesale & retail 35 6.88 
10 Others 39 7.66  
 
Measures of Conservatism 
 
Under conservative accounting, expenses or losses are immediately recognized, 
whereas revenues or gains are not until uncertainties surrounding economic 
events are resolved. According to Basu (1997), conservatism is defined as ''the 
accountant's tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize 
good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses.'' 
 
The most popular and general model to measure conservatism is Basu's (1997) 
reverse regression stock return model. However, Basu's (1997) model has some 
potential limitations. First, it cannot distinguish transitory gain or loss 
components in earnings from random error in accruals (e.g., miscounting 
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inventory) and from some types of earnings management (Ball & Shivakumar, 
2005). Namely, Basu's (1997) model only reflects stock market's reaction to bad 
news and good news for the firm; it does not recognise a firm's substantial 
accounting earnings changes due to conservatism. Second, after the Asian 
financial crisis, almost all Korean firms suffered financial distress, and thus, 
financial indexes (e.g., stock price, or stock return) were significantly decreased 
or discounted. Thus, Basu's (1997) model, an association test between earnings 
and stock return, cannot identify whether a higher level of conservatism results 
from increased conservative accounting methods or worse firm financial status 
(Choi, 2007).  
 
To overcome these potential limitations of Basu (1997), Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) estimate conservatism using the relationship between cash flows from 
operations and accruals. They argue that the incremental association between 
accruals and negative cash flows over the association between accruals and total 
cash flows represents the degree of conservatism. We test the impact of foreign 
ownership on conservatism using three different models, proposed by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006): Cash flow (CF) Model, Dechow and Dichev (DD) model, 
and Jones model. 
 
(1) CF model 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , 5 , ,
6 , , 7 , , , ,
* *
* * *
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
ACC CFO NCFO NCFO CFO FOREIGN FOREIGN CFO
FOREIGN NCFO FOREIGN NCFO CFO Year
a β β β β β
β β e
= + + + + +
+ + + +∑
 
(2) DD model 
 
, 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 , , 6 ,
7 , , 8 , , 9 , , ,
,
*
* * * *
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t
ACC CFO CFO CFO NCFO NCFO CFO FOREIGN
FOREIGN CFO FOREIGN NCFO FOREIGN NCFO CFO
Year
a β β β β β β
β β β
e
− += + + + + + +
+ + +
+ +∑
 
(3) Jones model 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , , 6 ,
7 , , 8 , , 9 , , ,
,
*
* * * *
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t
ACC REV PPE CFO NCFO NCFO CFO FOREIGN
FOREIGN CFO FOREIGN NCFO FOREIGN NCFO CFO
Year
a β β β β β β
β β β
e
= + ∆ + + + + +
+ + +
+ +∑
  
where, for firm i and time t, and ACC is Accruals (Net Income + Depreciation – 
Cash Flow from Operations) 8; NCFOi,t is a dummy variable, which takes 1 if 
CFOi,t is negative, otherwise 0; CFO is cash flow from operations; ∆REV is 
change in revenue; PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment; FOREIGN is 
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percentage of equity shares held by all foreign shareholders as of the end of the 
year, and calculated as the total number of shares held by foreign shareholders 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Because the magnitudes of 
accrual components vary with firm size, each component except for FOREIGN is 
scaled by average total assets. 
 
Three models, proposed by Ball and Shivakumar (2006), measure conservatism 
as the incremental coefficient on association between accruals and negative cash 
flows over the association between accruals and total cash flows. In each model, 
the incremental coefficient of NCFO*CFO corresponds to the degree of 
conservatism, and thus, positive incremental coefficients are expected for all 
accruals models. In model (1), (2), and (3), the incremental effects of foreign 
ownership on accounting conservatism are captured by the positive coefficient on 
the interaction form (FOREIGN*NCFO*CFO). If foreign ownership increases 
conservatism, the incremental coefficient on (FOREIGN*NCFO*CFO) should be 
positive.  
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Figure 1 represents industry distributions of foreign ownership during the test 
periods from 2000 to 2005. As shown in Figure 1, the largest industry groups of 
foreign ownership are "chemical & rubber plastic" and "electronics & electric 
manufacture", while the smallest are "construction" and "textile & footwear". 
This feature of foreign ownership supports that foreign shareholders prefer large 
manufacturing firms with good accounting performance, lower unsystematic risk, 
and lower leverage, but they underweight smaller and highly leveraged firms 
(Kang & Stulz, 1997). 
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Figure 1. Foreign ownership distribution by industry from 2000 to 2005 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for variables. The mean and median of 
accruals (ACC) as dependent variables are –0.042 and –0.035, respectively. Total 
accruals are calculated as (Net Income + Depreciation – Cash Flows from 
Operation), following Givoly and Hayn (2000). The mean value of cash flows 
from operations (CFO) is 5.7% of total assets. The mean values of ∆REV and 
PPE used in Jones model are 0.037 and 0.464, respectively. Foreign ownership 
has a mean value of 0.081 and a median value of 0.008. The severe difference 
between the mean and median of foreign ownership implies that foreign 
ownership is concentrated in specific firms as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
ACC –0.042 –0.035 –31.613 21.616 0.759 
CFO 0.057 0.054 –8.462 27.680 0.539 
∆REV  0.037  0.043 –30.117  11.230  0.742 
PPE  0.464 0.393  0.002 0.910  3.192 
FOREIGN  0.081 0.008 0.000  0.993 0.144 
 
Table 3 gives the Pearson correlation matrix of variables. Consistent with 
previous research (Dechow, 1994; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005), total accruals 
(ACC) and cash flows from operation (CFO) are negatively correlated (–0.776, p 
< 0.01), as are ACC and PPE (–0.035, p < 0.05). Foreign ownership (FOREIGN) 
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has a negative relationship with ACC at the 0.01 level (–0.062), suggesting that 
total accruals decrease as foreign ownership increases. CFO is positively 
correlated with both ∆REV (0.02) and PPE (0.052), respectively, at the 0.01 level. 
Thus, an increase in CFO is closely linked to an increase in tangible assets and 
current sales.  
 
Table 3 
Pearson correlation statistics 
 
 ACC ∆REV PPE CFO FOREIGN 
ACC  1.000     
∆REV –0.011  1.000    
PPE –0.035**  0.225 1.000     
CFO –0.776***  0.020***  0.052*** 1.000  
FOREIGN –0.062***  0.108***  0.283***  0.048***  1.000 
 
**Significant at level 0.05; ***Significant at level 0.01 
 
 
Results of Conservatism in Korea 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the regression for foreign ownership and 
conservatism using the pooled sample of 3,054 firm-year observations over the 
2000 to 2005 period. In Table 4, three regression models, (1) CF model, (2) DD 
model, and (3) Jones model, all seemed to be well fitted, with statistically 
significant F-statistics (p < 0.01) and high explanatory power (adjusted R2).  
 
As expected, the coefficients of CFOi,t in three piecewise linear models shown in 
Table 4 are all significantly negative (–1.089, –1.085, and –1.343) at the 0.01 
level. This result suggests that accruals play an important role in decreasing the 
noise of cash flows, consistent with the findings of Ball and Shivakumar (2006). 
However, inconsistent with our expectations, the coefficient of the PPE had a 
significant positive value. According to Yoon and Miller (2002), the Jones model 
has the highest misspecification problem in the Korean setting, due to the 
positive sign of the coefficient on PPE. Thus, the positive coefficient of PPE in 
this study also supports the finding of Yoon and Miller (2002). The incremental 
coefficients on NCFO*CFO in the three models are significant and positive at the 
0.01 level. This result suggests that conservatism exists in Korea. Higher 
conservatism might be impacted by the Korean corporate governance reforms, 
launched after the Asian financial crisis. Generally, controlling family 
shareholders in Korea have positively participated in firms' management, and 
they also serve as top management such as CEOs and CFOs. In 1998, the legal 
liabilities of controlling shareholders were broadened to increase their 
accountability when involved in management in any form. Since April 1999, the 
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penalties for unfaithful or fraudulent disclosure have been raised substantially. 
For example, directors who falsify or alter important matters in business reports 
may be imprisoned for up to five years or receive a fine up to 0.5 billion KRW 
(US$0.5 million)9. Civil liabilities can be imposed on majority shareholders as 
well as on CEOs and CFOs in an attempt to secure accounting transparency. For 
instance, after launching corporate governance reforms, the Korean government 
filed civil suits against 52 former directors of troubled firms and criminal 
lawsuits against 73 former directors of 27 troubled firms (The Ministry of 
Finance and Economics, 2002). Strong legal punishment such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002 (the SOX) imposes management accountability for providing 
higher-quality financial reporting. Watts (2003a) indicates that government 
regulation of financial reporting induces conservatism, because regulators are 
more often faced with criticism when firms overstate net assets than when firms 
understate net assets. Watts (2003b) argues that courts generally tend to punish 
overstatement of earnings/assets more than understatement, because shareholders 
are more likely to suffer losses when earnings/assets are overstated. Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) argue that demands for higher quality financial statements are 
reflected in the greater legal obligations of issuers, managers, and auditors to 
recognise economic losses in a more timely fashion. Lobo and Zhou (2006) 
document evidence that the SOX increase conservatism by imposing significant 
criminal penalties on management (e.g., CEOs and CFOs). Thus, strong legal 
punishments are expected to reduce management discretion over financial 
reporting, thereby increasing conservatism. The results in this study support and 
correspond with previous research. 
Results of Foreign Ownership on Conservatism 
 
To investigate whether foreign ownership increases conservatism in Korean firms, 
the incremental coefficient on the interaction form (FOREIGN*NCFO*CCFO) is 
employed to capture conservatism. If foreign ownership increases conservatism, 
the incremental coefficient on (FOREIGN*NCFO*CCFO) will be significantly 
positive.  
 
In the CF model, the incremental coefficient on (FOREIGN*NCFO*CCFO) is 
positively significant at the 0.01 level (2.020). The positive effect of foreign 
ownership on conservatism remains unchanged in the DD and Jones models. The 
second column in Table 4 presents the results from the DD model. In the DD 
model, the value of the incremental coefficient on (FOREIGN*NCFO*CCFO) is 
significantly positive at 0.01 (1.970). Consistent with the results of two models, 
the value of the incremental coefficient on (FOREIGN*NCFO*CCFO) in the 
Jones model also has a significantly positive value (1.390; p < 0.01).  
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To summarise, three conservatism models show strong positive impacts of 
foreign ownership on conservatism. Consistent with prior research (Cheon, 2003; 
Choe et al., 2005), foreign ownership increases conservatism to resolve 
information asymmetries and to monitor opportunistic managerial accounting 
choices and decisions, thereby increasing the quality of financial reporting and 
transparency. Thus, the hypothesis of this study is well supported, indicating that 
the active-monitoring hypothesis of foreign ownership is accepted in Korea.  
 
Fixed Effect (FE) Results of Foreign Ownership on Conservatism 
 
As this study utilises panel data, panel-study methodology should be considered. 
The advantages of panel-data methodology lie in more robust information, more 
variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more 
efficiency (Baltagi, 2005). The pooled-OLS, the basic estimation method in this 
study, treats time-series data of a firm just as different firms at a point in time, but 
this method is similar to cross-sectional analyses in that it does not control for 
unidentified inter-firm differences. According to Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 
(1999), the choice of ownership structure depends on unobserved firm 
characteristics such as contractual, regulatory, or informational environments. 
With panel data, one common treatment of this unobserved time-constant effect is 
to use fixed-effect (FE) regression, known as least square dummy variable 
(LSDV) analysis (Wooldridge, 2002; Baltagi, 2005). Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
suggest that firm fixed effect estimators should be used in examinations of the 
relationships between ownership and firm performance because the cross-
sectional variation in ownership explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity is a 
firm fixed effect. The general way of choosing between fixed effects and random 
effects are the Hausman (1978) tests. This study conducts Hausman tests for 
whether a fixed effect model is acceptable against the alternative of a random 
effects model. For samples in this study, the Hausman test rejects a random 
effects model; thus, a fixed effect model is applied to test robustness. 
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Table 4 
Pooled regression results 
 
 
Expected 
Sign 
CF Model DD Model Jones Model 
Constant ? –0.012 –0.011 –0.019 
∆REV +   0.110*** 
PPE -   0.026*** 
CFOi,t - –1.089*** –1.085*** –1.343*** 
CFOi,t-1 +  –0.012  
CFOi,t+1 +  0.010  
NCFO ? –0.008 –0.007*** –0.013 
NCFO*CFO + 1.117*** 1.128*** 1.337*** 
FOREIGN ? –0.079** –0.076* –0.130*** 
FOREIGN*CFO ? 1.191*** 1.182*** 1.461*** 
FOREIGN*NCFO ? 0.380*** 0.382*** 0.386*** 
FOREIGN*NCFO*CFO + 2.020*** 1.970*** 1.390*** 
Adjusted R2  0.653 0.652 0.676 
F-Statistics  471.615*** 404.629*** 415.168*** 
 
*Significant at level 0.10; **Significant at level 0.05; ***Significant at level 0.01 
 
Table 5 represents the fixed effect estimation as a robustness check method. The 
negative coefficients of CFOi,t remain strongly significant in all three piecewise 
linear models applied to fixed effects (–0.567, –0.612, and –0.477, p < 0.01). 
Other variables in the fixed effect results are highly consistent with the results 
obtained from the pooled-OLS model. The incremental coefficients on 
(FOREIGN*NCFO*CCFO) are reinforced in all three models following the 
pooled-OLS. In the CF model, DD model, and Jones model, the incremental 
coefficients on (FOREIGN*NCFO*CCFO) are significantly positive (4.659, 
4.433, and 4.996) at the 0.01 level in a fixed effect model, respectively.   
 
As discussed in pooled regression results, the positive effect of foreign 
ownership on conservatism should be accepted due to findings of a positive 
association with total accruals on several tests of conservatism. Moreover, the 
results of our fixed effect model strongly support the positive effects of foreign 
ownership on conservatism as a proxy for financial reporting quality. 
Consequently, in Korea, higher foreign ownership increases accounting 
conservatism, thus playing an important role in monitoring management to 
supplement domestic institutional investors in an emerging market. 
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Table 5 
Fixed Effect (FE) regression results 
 
 
Expected 
Sign 
CF Model DD Model Jones Model 
Constant ? –0.019*** –0.012*** 0.004 
∆REV +   0.037*** 
PPE –   0.066*** 
CFOi,t – –0.567*** –0.612*** –0.477*** 
CFOi,t-1 +  0.073***  
CFOi,t+1 +  –0.014*  
NCFO ? –0.007 0.006 0.006 
NCFO*CFO + 0.098 0.219 –0.207 
FOREIGN ? –0.081 –0.062 –0.095* 
FOREIGN*CFO ? 0.378*** 0.328*** 0.259*** 
FOREIGN*NCFO ? 0.389*** 0.350*** 0.411*** 
FOREIGN*NCFO*CFO + 4.659*** 4.433*** 4.996*** 
Year Fixed Effects  Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Effects  Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2  0.857 0.861 0.836 
F-Statistics  28.738*** 29.743*** 29.096*** 
*Significant at level 0.10; **Significant at level 0.05; ***Significant at level 0.01 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study investigates whether foreign ownership increases conservatism in 
Korean firms using 3,054 firm-year panel data of Korea over the 2000 to 2005 
period. Specifically, this study uses three piecewise accruals models, proposed by 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006): (1) CF model, (2) DD model, and (3) Jones model. 
 
Foreign ownership as a major institutional shareholder is explained using two 
conflicting hypotheses: the active-monitoring hypothesis and the transient 
hypothesis. Prior researchers (Sachs & Warner, 1995; Khanna & Palepu, 2000) 
have found that foreign shareholders, in emerging markets, have stronger 
incentives and expertise to independently monitor firms to protect their wealth 
and to reduce monitoring costs. In addition, financial reporting conservatism 
plays an important role in measuring financial reporting quality in emerging 
markets, dominated by controlling family shareholders (or ultimate owner). 
Conservatism constrains managerial opportunistic behaviours and reduces 
information asymmetries to require greater verifiability of revenues than that of 
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expenses, thereby increasing the quality of financial reporting.  
 
In advance, there are two potential limitations related to future research. First of 
all, the tested period in this study is rather dated. To test more extensive 
associations between foreign ownership and financial reporting quality, the 
testing period should be expanded, although the data collection required 
considerable effort. Second, financial reporting quality may differ depending 
upon the legal/judicial regime of foreign ownership. Differences between 
common-law and code-law regimes affect the financial reporting quality and 
corporate governance systems (Ball, 2001). Thus, more efforts could also be 
made to explain who foreign owners are and from where they came.  
  
This study provides empirical evidence of the effects of foreign ownership on 
financial reporting quality in emerging markets. Consistent with the active-
monitoring hypothesis of foreign ownership, this study finds that foreign 
ownership increases conservatism, and this finding is supported by all three 
models. In addition, this result is confirmed by fixed effect estimation. Thus, 
higher proportions of foreign ownership induce firms to improve transparency 
and provide higher-quality financial reporting. 
 
  
NOTES 
 
1. In 1970, foreign ownership was only 3% of total US firm's equity (the NYSE 
 Fact Book). 
2. The Korean Stock Exchange (2005). Largest stockholder and foreign 
 stockholder, end of 2004 [in Korean]. 
3. As of 2013, foreign ownership in the Korean Stock Exchange reached 35%. 
4. SIC is a two-digit code classifying all industries into 20 major industry groups 
 administered by the Korean National Statistical Office. The two-digit code 
 designates each major industry group. This description is available on web 
 source:  https://kssc.kostat.go.kr:8443/ksscNew_web/ekssc/main/main.do  
5. As a public database, Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System (DART) is 
 an electronic disclosure system that mandatorily enforces firms to submit 
 Business Reports (equivalent to the US 10-K) to Korean Financial Supervisory 
 Commission (KFSC) within 90 days from the fiscal year end, where it becomes 
 publicly available to investors and other users online. 
6. The financial statements information of Korean firms on OSIRIS is provided by 
 the Korean Information Service (KIS). 
7. KIS is a credit rating agency in Korea and provides corporate financial and 
 ownership information on publicly traded firms as well as privately held firms. 
 KIS also receives financial and ownership information of Korean firms from the 
 Korea Financial Supervisory Board and checks the integrity of the data. It 
 provides the most comprehensive database available in Korea. 
8. Givoly and Hayn (2000). 
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9. Article 207-3, The Korean Securities and Exchange Law. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M., & Matos, P. (2011). Does governance travel around 
the world? Evidence from institutional investors. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 100(1), 154–181. 
Ahn, Y. Y., Shin, H. H., & Chang, J. (2005). The relationship between the foreign investor 
and information asymmetry. The Korean Accounting Review, 30, 109–131 
[Printed in Korean]. 
Bae, K., Ozoguz, A., Tan, H., & Wirjanto, T. S. (2012). Do foreigners facilitate 
information transmission in emerging markets? Journal of Financial Economics, 
105(1), 209–227. 
Balakrishnan, K., Watts, R. L., & Zuo, L. (2015). The effect of accounting conservatism 
on corporate investment during the global financial crisis. MIT Sloan Research 
Paper No. 4941-11. Available in SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1952722 
Ball, R. (2001). Infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient system of 
public financial reporting and disclosure. Brookings-Wharton Papers on 
Financial Services, 2001(1), 127–169. 
Ball, R., & Shivakumar, L. (2005). Earnings quality in U.K. private firms: Comparative 
loss recognition. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 38, 83–128. 
Ball, R., & Shivakumar, L. (2006). The role of accruals in asymmetrically timely gain and 
loss recognition. Journal of Accounting Research, 44, 207–256. 
Ball, R., Kothari, S. P., & Robin, A. (2000). The effect of international factors on 
properties of accounting numbers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29, 1–
51. 
Ball, R., Robin, A., & Wu, J. S. (2003). Incentives versus standards: Properties of 
accounting income in four East Asian countries. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 36, 235–270. 
Baltagi, B. (2005). Econometric analysis of panel data (Vol. 1). Chichester: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Basu, S. (1997). The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24, 3–37. 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C., & Lundblad, C. (2011). Financial openness and productivity. 
World Development, 39, 1–19. 
Cheon, Y. S. (2003). The association between foreign and domestic institutional 
ownership and earnings quality. The Korean Management Review, 32, 1001–
1032 [Printed in Korean]. 
Choe, H., Kho, B-C., & Stulz, R. M. (2005). Do domestic investors have an edge? The 
trading experience of foreign investors in Korea. Review of Financial Studies, 18, 
795–829. 
Choi, H., Sul, W., & Cho, Y. (2011). Board structure, minority shareholders protection, 
and foreign block ownership. The Journal of Professional Management, 14(2), 
1–26. 
 
Yohan An 
  100 
Choi, J-S. (2007). Changes in the forecast relevancy, persistence, and valuation relevancy 
of earnings components between before and after the Financial Crisis. 
Accounting and Auditing Research, 45, 237–276 [Printed in Korean]. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, H. P. (2000). The separation of ownership and control 
in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 81–112. 
Dechow, P. M. (1994). Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm 
performance: The role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 18(1), 3–42. 
Dechow, P., & Dichev, D. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of 
accrual estimation errors. The Accounting Review, 77, 35–59. 
Dahlquist, M., & Robertsson, G. (2001). Direct foreign ownership, institutional investors, 
and firm characteristics. Journal of Financial Economics, 59. 413–440. 
Fan, J., & Wong, T. J. (2002). Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of 
accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33, 
401–425. 
Givoly, D., & Hayn, C. (2000). The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows 
and accruals: Has financial accounting become more conservative? Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 29, 1285–1331. 
Grambovas, C. A., Giner, B., & Christodoulou, D. (2006). Earnings conservatism: Panel 
data evidence from European Union and the United States. ABACUS, 42, 345–
378. 
Graves, S. B. (1988). Institutional ownership and corporate R&D in the computer 
industry. Academy of Management Journal, 31(2), 417–428. 
Grinblatt, M., & Keloharju, M. (2000). The investment behavior and performance of various 
investor types: A study of Finland's unique data set. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 55, 43–67. 
Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 46(6), 1251–1271. 
He, W., & Shen, J. (2014). Do foreign investors improve informational efficiency of 
 stock prices? Evidence from Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 27, 32–48. 
Henry, P. (2000). Stock market liberalization, economic reform, and emerging market 
 equity. Journal of Finance, 55, 529–564. 
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., & Palia, D. (1999). Understanding the determinants 
 of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. 
 Journal of Financial Economics, 53(3), 353–384. 
Huang, W., & Zhu, T. (2015). Foreign institutional investors and corporate governance in 
 emerging markets: Evidence of a spilt-share structure reform in China. Journal 
 of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming. 
Imhoff, E. Jr., & Thomas, J. (1989). Accounting quality. Working paper, University of 
Michigan. 
Kang, J. K., & Stulz, R. M. (1997). Why is there a home bias? An analysis of foreign 
portfolio equity ownership in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 46, 3–28. 
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. G. (2000). Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets: 
An analysis of diversified Indian business groups. Journal of Finance, 55, 867–
891. 
 
 
Does Foreign Ownership Increase Financial Reporting Quality? 
 101 
Kho, B. C., Stulz, R. M., & Warnock, F. E. (2009). Financial globalization, governance, 
and the evolution of the home bias. Journal of Accounting Research, 47(2), 597-
635. 
Kim, J., Krinsky, I., & Lee, J. (1997). Institutional holdings and trading volume reactions 
to quarterly earnings announcement. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and 
Finance, 12, 1–14. 
LaFond, R., & Watts, R. L. (2008). The information role of conservatism. Accounting 
Review, 83(2), 447–478. 
Lara, J. M. G., Osma, B. G., & Penalva, F. (2009). Accounting conservatism and corporate 
governance. Review of Accounting Studies, 14(1), 161–201. 
Lemmon, M. L., & Lins, K. V. (2003). Ownership structure, corporate governance, and 
firm value: Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis. Journal of Finance, 58, 
1445–1468. 
Lien, D., Tseng, M. C., & Wu, S. (2013). Foreign investors in Taiwan: Their roles and 
government perspectives. Business Horizons, 56, 749–756. 
Lobo, G. J., & Zhou, J. (2006). Did conservatism in financial reporting increase after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial evidence. The Accounting Review, 20, 57–73. 
Mitton, T. (2002). A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East 
Asian financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 64, 215–241. 
Penman, S., & Zhang, X. (2002). Accounting conservatism, the quality of earnings, and 
stock returns. The Accounting Review, 77, 237–264. 
Rezaee, Z. (2002). Financial statement fraud: Prevention and detection. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Sachs, J., & Warner, A. (1995). Economic reform and the process of global integration. 
Bookings Papers on Economic Activity [25th Anniversary Issue], 26(1), 1–118. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Block shareholders and corporate control. Journal 
of Political Economy, 95, 461–488. 
Watts, R. L. (2003a). Conservatism in accounting part I: Explanations and implications. 
Accounting Horizons, 17, 207–221. 
Watts, R. L. (2003b). Conservatism in accounting part II: Explanations and research 
opportunities. Accounting Horizons, 17, 287–301. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT press. 
Yoon, S. S., & Miller, G. A. (2002). Cash from operations and earnings management in 
Korea. The International Journal of Accounting, 37, 395–412. 
 
 
